PEDIATRICS Vol. 80 No. 3 September 1987, pp. 344-350
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Submit a response
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me when eLetters are posted
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow E-mail this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My File Cabinet
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via CrossRef
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Hickson, G. B.
Right arrow Articles by Perrin, J. M.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by Hickson, G. B.
Right arrow Articles by Perrin, J. M.

Physician Reimbursement by Salary or Fee-for-Service: Effect on Physician Practice Behavior in a Randomized Prospective Study

Gerald B. Hickson MD1, William A. Altemeier MD1, and James M. Perrin MD1

1 From the Department of Pediatrics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee

We used a resident continuity clinic to compare prospectively the impact of salary v fee-for-service reimbursement on physician practice behavior. This model allowed randomization of physicians into salary and fee-for-service groups and separation of the effects of reimbursement from patient behavior. Physicians reimbursed by fee-for-services scheduled more visits per patient than did salaried physicians (3.69 visits v 2.83 visits, P < .01) and saw their patients more often (2.70 visits v 2.21 visits, P < .05) during the 9-month study. Almost all of this difference was because fee-for-service physicians saw more well patients than salaried physicians (1.42 visits and .99 visits per enrolled patient, respectively, P < .01). Evaluating visits by American Academy of Pediatrics' guidelines indicated that fee-for-service physicians saw more patients for well-childcare than salaried physicians because they missed fewer recommended ommended visits and scheduled visits in excess of those recommendations. Fee-for-service physicians also provided better continuity of care than salaried physicians by attending a larger percentage of all visits made by their patients (86.6% of visits v 78.3% of visits, P < .05), and by encouraging fewer emergency visits per enrolled patient (0.12 visits v 0.22 visits, P < .01). Physicians' interest in private practice, as determined by their career plans, correlated significantly with total number of patients enrolled (r = .48, P < .05) and total clinic patients seen by each resident during the study (r = .40, P < .05): reimbursement was not significantly related to these two outcomes after correction for differences in career plans by fee-for-service and salaried physicians. A resident continuity clinic was used as a model, and it was possible to isolate the effect of reimbursement from patient/parent behavior and to demonstrate that reimbursement method and physician interest in practice motivated physicians to influence the use of outpatient services by their patients.

Key Words: physician reimbursement • fee-for-service • salary

Accepted on December 2, 1986




This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
JAMAHome page
M. B. Rosenthal and R. A. Dudley
Pay-for-Performance: Will the Latest Payment Trend Improve Care?
JAMA, February 21, 2007; 297(7): 740 - 744.
[Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
PediatricsHome page
R. S. Valet, D. F. Kutny, G. B. Hickson, and W. O. Cooper
Family Reports of Care Denials for Children Enrolled in TennCare
Pediatrics, July 1, 2004; 114(1): e37 - e42.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
PediatricsHome page
T. G. Ferris, D. Dougherty, D. Blumenthal, and J. M. Perrin
A Report Card on Quality Improvement for Children's Health Care
Pediatrics, January 1, 2001; 107(1): 143 - 155.
[Abstract] [Full Text]


Home page
CLIN PEDIATRHome page
A. M. van Dulmen
Physician Reimbursement and the Medical Encounter: An Observational Study in Dutch Pediatrics
Clinical Pediatrics, October 1, 2000; 39(10): 591 - 601.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
ChestHome page
W. R. Smith
Evidence for the Effectiveness of Techniques To Change Physician Behavior
Chest, August 1, 2000; 118(2_suppl): 8S - 17S.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
QJMHome page
T. Gosden, L. Pedersen, and D. Torgerson
How should we pay doctors? A systematic review of salary payments and their effect on doctor behaviour
QJM, January 1, 1999; 92(1): 47 - 55.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
Arch Pediatr Adolesc MedHome page
G. B. Hickson, W. O. Cooper, P. W. Campbell, and W. A. Altemeier III
Effects of Pediatrician Characteristics on Management Decisions in Simulated Cases Involving Apparent Life-Threatening Events
Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med, April 1, 1998; 152(4): 383 - 387.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
Med Care Res RevHome page
F. J. Hellinger
The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed Care Plans: A Review of the Evidence
Med Care Res Rev, September 1, 1996; 53(3): 294 - 314.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
NEJMHome page
P. J. Greco and J. M. Eisenberg
Changing Physicians' Practices
N. Engl. J. Med., October 21, 1993; 329(17): 1271 - 1274.
[Full Text]


Home page
American Journal of Medical QualityHome page
S. Herschberg
Potential Conflicts of Interest in the Delivery of Medical Services: An Analysis of the Situation and a Proposal
American Journal of Medical Quality, June 1, 1992; 7(2): 54 - 58.
[Abstract] [PDF]